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Abstract: 
This study investigated the relationship between individual and job characteristics of mental 
health social workers and professional dissonance—an experienced conflict between values and 
job tasks. A 33-item questionnaire, designed specifically for the study’s purposes was utilized. A 
total of 320 usable study questionnaires were returned (44.5% response rate). The primary study 
hypothesis, that professional dissonance is related to individual and job characteristics, was 
partially supported by the data. While job characteristics appeared to have little influence on 
dissonance, several individual characteristics of the respondents were statistically related to level 
of dissonance. Specifically, men with the most years of experience and with lower reported 
attachment to self-determination reported higher levels of dissonance. Study participants 
affirmed the importance of life-long supervision in managing dissonance in practice. 
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Article: 
Excellent mental health practice can often be difficult and complex. Indeed, mental health 
practitioners frequently face seemingly ‘‘no-win’’ situations when they are required to negotiate 
workable solutions between client and practitioner goals that may not be compatible, or when 
interventions result in value dilemmas, or what Victor Frankl (1988) has termed a ‘‘value 
collision.’’ For example, the current mental health practice context increasingly requires mental 
health practitioners to engage in involuntary treatment interventions leading to a practice climate 
rife with potential value collisions. Such potential value collisions can include: providing 
mandated or involuntary treatment, intervening in a consumer’s decision-making about 
medication, breaching confidentiality to communicate with family members, and making 
decisions about a consumer’s ability to direct his or her own life, such as advocating for 
outpatient commitment, or court orders allowing forced medication. 
Opinions in the literature about involuntary interventions vary with some authors (Bentley, 1993; 
Bentley & Taylor, 2002; Dewees, 2002; Kutchins & Kirk, 1997; Taylor & Bentley, 2004) 
pointing out the incongruity— and perhaps, incompatibility—between involuntary treatment 
interventions and professional value positions especially pertaining to self-determination. Other 
writers strongly disagree with this perceived incompatibility (Murdach, 1996; Rosenson, 1993) 
and cite the consumers’ right to treatment as an important area for social work support, not just 
the right to refuse treatment (Mizrahi, 1992). Still others suggest that taking for and against 
positions in this debate distracts the mental health community from more important questions 
about the state of service delivery in the mental health arena (Saks, 2002). Involuntary 
interventions are just one area of practice where the tension between evolving mental health 
interventions and longstanding helping profession values places practitioners in mental health 
settings at potential risk for what is being called here ‘‘professional dissonance.’’ 
PROFESSIONAL DISSONANCE DEFINED 
Professional dissonance is conceptualized as a feeling of discomfort arising from the conflict 
between professional values and expected or required job tasks. The conceptualization of 
professional dissonance as a researchable topic for practice, as well as the generation of the 
study’s dissonance-reducing cognitions, owes a large debt to Leon Festinger and colleagues’ 
previous work on cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962, 1964; Festinger & Carlsmith 1959; 
Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). The current research specifically focused on social workers and 
the social work value of self-determination and its potential for generating dissonance within 
mental health settings, especially amid increased controversy around involuntary outpatient 
commitment in particular, and the call for more assertive community mental health programs in 
general (Bentley & Taylor, 2002; Dennis & Monahan, 1996; Moran, 2000; Torrey & Zdanowicz, 
2002). 
The primary purpose of the research was to refine the concept of professional dissonance and to 
draw attention to and stimulate dialogue about its existence, and its impact on individual 
practitioners working in the mental health arena with the vision of adding to the ongoing 
dialogue in social work and related professions around negotiating a satisfactory, sustainable 
balance between consumer rights and needs and professional or societal requirements, rights and 
duties. A more specific aim of the study was the exploration and description of the types of 
individual characteristics and job tasks that most contribute to professional dissonance in daily 
practice. It was also hoped that the proposed research would yield insight into the ways 
practitioners in mental health ‘‘live with’’ and manage professional dissonance. In this way, 
professional longevity and job efficacy of individual practitioners is ultimately protected, and 
excellence in mental health practice is promoted. 
PROFESSIONAL DISSONANCE IN AN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Examining the larger environment of mental health service delivery in this country involves 
taking into account the forces and events that have shaped the development of pervasive cultural 
beliefs about individual versus societal rights. In this way, professional dissonance can be 
understood as a problem that is part of the tapestry of contemporary mental health practice and 
policy. For example, since the beginnings of the country, Americans have struggled with the 
emphasis and protection that individual liberties could and should have while simultaneously 
maximizing the general welfare. Self-determination as a concept is similar to the ideas of liberty 
and the pursuit of happiness that appear in the Declaration of Independence, one of the first 
American documents. This early emergence of self-determination is consistent with Freedberg’s 
(1989) assertion that the roots of the concept reach back to the Enlightenment. As perennial as 
the ideas of self-determination, freedom and liberty are themselves, so is the competition and 
tension surrounding them in a society that equally values social welfare, general safety, 
protection and maintenance of the community. In other words, the struggle to work out an 
acceptable balance between the sometimes mutually exclusive goals of personal liberty and 
societal well-being is a source of dissonance for our legal system and, indeed, society at large. 
This same struggle is played out in mental health between the rights of individual consumers to 
refuse or accept treatment and the rights of communities to feel safe physically, psychologically 
and aesthetically. The task of negotiating about this larger struggle falls to mental health 
practitioners, in our often multiple (and sometimes mutually exclusive) roles as consumer 
advocate, family advocate, risk manager, agency employee, and community citizen. 
In trying to negotiate the struggle between consumer rights and liberties and societal rights and 
interests, as well as juggle their multiple roles, practitioners may feel they have a daunting 
assignment. They are regularly asked and often required, to formulate practice decisions that 
both protect society and maximize the rights of the individual—perhaps an impossible task. 
When the two aims are incompatible, practitioners find themselves in the position of making a 
practice decision that may be unwanted and/or directly opposed by the consumer. An example of 
such a decision would be requiring a consumer who is actively psychotic and handing out 
leaflets in the park but not currently dangerous, to be hospitalized against his/her will. The 
decision to hospitalize may conflict with the value of self-determination. In these situations, 
practitioners have to deal with layers upon layers of competing values at the personal, group and 
societal levels (Loewenberg, Dolgoff, & Harrington, 2000). This research project was influenced 
by key concepts in cognitive dissonance theory as well as existential theory. Existential theory, 
especially, speaks to the internal, spiritual struggle to live an authentic life and is therefore 
instructive in developing professional dissonance as a problem for social workers. 
PROFESSIONAL DISSONANCE AND EXISTENTIALISM 
The core ideas of existential theory are important to the present research because the key 
existential issues of ‘‘authenticity’’ vs. ‘‘bad faith’’ and ‘‘ontological guilt’’ vs. ‘‘ontological 
anxiety,’’ speak to the current struggle in the mental health practice context to negotiate a 
practice position that simultaneously protects a consumer’s rights (even to fail) and ensures the 
practitioners’ ability to make professional, caring and sometimes unpopular decisions about what 
should happen in an intervention. The discussion of professional dissonance highlights the notion 
of the dissonance process as one filled with confusion, angst and, hopefully in the end, 
professional and personal growth. Rollo May (1983), a prominent existential author wrote that 
the German word that Freud and Kierkegaard among others use for anxiety is ‘‘angst.’’ While it 
has no English equivalent, angst has been translated as ‘‘dread’’ as well as ‘‘anxiety’’ and 
captures the experience of being ‘‘torn’’ or in a dilemma. 
Quite simply, ontological anxiety is the price of living authentically. By contrast, choosing the 
more comfortable, non-anxiety provoking course of action will result short-term in feeling safer 
but long-term leads to the more malignant state of ‘‘ontological guilt.’’ Ontological anxiety, 
while uncomfortable is more a pain of risk or a growing pain, while ontological guilt is the pain 
of not accessing one’s potential and the ache of regret about ‘‘what might have been.’’ Series of 
bad faith actions result in heavy ontological guilt which envelopes the individual in shame and 
regret, paralyzing their process of becoming (Maddi, 1996). 
Existential psychology, with its focus on authenticity and responsibility, speaks directly to the 
cost of bad-faith actions. In this way, it answers the question of what happens to practitioners 
who consistently act in a way that conflicts with their ideas of what they should be doing or as 
Margolin (1997) calls it, living in contradiction. It also changes the negative cast of anxiety to 
encompass anxiety as a potential growing experience. In this way, existential psychology 
balances the prevailing view of anxiety as burn-out or pathological, by casting it as a growing 
pain. This recasting is appropriate for the current research study, which combined the views of 
anxiety as problematic (as seen in cognitive psychology and ego psychology) with the idea of 
anxiety as a possible vehicle to excellent practice in the crafting of the concept of professional 
dissonance. 
METHODS 
This study utilized a cross-sectional, survey design. The design was appropriate given the 
priority of collecting data from a large group of social work practitioners in this exploratory 
study. A 33-item questionnaire, designed specifically for the study’s purposes was utilized 
(copies are available from the 1st author). It combined Likert-type items, several open-ended 
questions and three case vignettes that portrayed hypothetical practitioners intervening in 
practice ‘‘gray areas’’ constructed to stimulate dissonance in the participants. Study vignettes 
were created by the author and utilized both expert consultation as well as pilot-testing to insure 
applicability to real-life practice situations. Professional dissonance as a variable was measured 
both directly and indirectly in an effort to maximize construct validity in this new instrument. In 
other words, participants were asked directly about professional dissonance in an open-ended 
question and their responses to the vignette situations were calculated to produce a dissonance 
score. 
Specifically, participants were asked to respond to 10 Likert-type items for each vignette. Each 
vignette was followed by an item regarding comfort with the intervention, an item about anxiety 
in similar situations, and a list of eight dissonance-reducing cognitions that the practitioner might 
have when making a decision about how to intervene in the case. In designing the instrument, 
each of the eight statements was related to a specific dissonance reducing cognition represented 
by cognitive distortions or defenses since resorting to defenses is often the way people reduce 
dissonance. For example, ‘‘Telling her (the consumer’s mother) about the session isn’t that big 
of a deal’’ related to the distortion of minimization. Participants endorsed each thought on a 
Likert-scale of 1–5, with five meaning they would be ‘‘very likely’’ to have that thought when 
deciding how to intervene. These scores were totaled and a ‘‘dissonance score’’ was calculated 
for each vignette. These were then summed across each participant’s responses to the three 
vignettes to create a Total Dissonance Score. Summing scores for corresponding cognitions also 
created subscale scores for each of the eight cognitive distortions/defenses across each of the 
three vignettes. In this way, scores were calculated for minimization, rationalization, denial/mind 
reading, projection, displacement, emotional reasoning, labeling and overgeneralization. 
Additionally, the three ‘‘comfort’’ questions, and three ‘‘anxiety’’ questions were summed to 
develop a total comfort and total anxiety score. Attitudes and experiences in involuntary 
treatment as well as opinions and experiences of self-determination in practice were included in 
the instrument. 
Seven hundred and fifty prospective participants were selected from the Register of clinical 
social workers, 11th Ed, a published document maintained by the National Association of Social 
Workers. This source was utilized primarily because of the high likelihood of accessing 
participants with a long practice history since one assumption of the study was that dissonance in 
practitioners might wax and wane over the course of their careers. Appropriate univariate, 
bivariate and multivariate data analysis methods were performed on the closed-ended data. 
Open-ended data was analyzed using a content analysis method at the word level that combined 
both qualitative and quantitative methods, in that similar responses were coded into categories 
and counted. 
HYPOTHESES 
The implicit research question associated with this study was the exploration of whether or not 
professional dissonance truly exists as a problem in mental health. Following from this, it was 
hypothesized that individual characteristics (gender, age, years in practice and selfreported 
commitment to the value of self determination) and job characteristics (frequency of involuntary 
intervention and associated comfort level, job setting, consumer population and primary job 
function) would account for some of the variance in reported levels of professional dissonance. 
Several secondary hypotheses were also formulated. Specifically, it was expected that a positive 
association between stated levels of self-determination with levels of professional dissonance 
would exist, since a high commitment to self-determination should result in more opportunities 
for dissonance when encountering paternalistic practice interventions. A similar positive 
association between amount of involuntary treatment experience and professional dissonance 
was expected for the same reason. A negative association was expected between years of 
practice experience and professional dissonance since it was expected that in order to remain in 
the field, dissonance would have to be resolved in some fashion. 
FINDINGS 
A total of 320 usable study questionnaires were returned (44.5% response rate). The responding 
participants had an average of approximately 25 years in the field and a mean age of 56 years. A 
large majority of participants identified themselves as White/Caucasian (293, 91.6%). Gender 
was fairly representative at 62.8% female (N = 201) and 36.8% male (N = 117). The majority of 
participants described their primary job setting as private practice 50.6% (N = 162)  
The vignettes portion of this new instrument yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of .80. Despite this 
indication of high internal consistency, issues of content validity emerged with regard to the 
study vignettes portion of the instrument. Specifically, while participants indicated experiencing 
dissonance in the form of conflict, discomfort, anxiety, anger and ambivalence, they did not 
endorse the related ‘‘dissonance-reducing’’ cognitions that followed each vignette. These results 
suggest taking a closer look at the structure of the vignettes or, on a broader level, reconsidering 
the study methodology from a survey method to a structured interview method in future studies. 
Responses to the vignettes included the endorsement of eight dissonance-reducing cognitions as 
well as Likert-type questions related to anxiety and discomfort with the hypothetical 
intervention. Table 1 displays average vignette scores. The primary study hypothesis, that 
professional dissonance is related to individual and job characteristics, was partially supported 
by the data in that job characteristics did not appear to influence dissonance scores but gender, 
length in the field, and reported level of commitment to self-determination were statistically 
related to level of dissonance (Total Dissonance Score). Specifically, men with the most years of 
experience and with lower reported attachment to self-determination reported higher levels of 
dissonance (F = 4.945, p < .027). Importantly, responses to open-ended questions affirmed the 
experience of dissonance in practice and respondents described the rich and diverse ways that 
they deal with this issue, emphasizing consultation and supervision. Specifically, participants 
were asked to describe how they feel and what they do when their professional values seem to be 
in conflict with a practice situation. Interestingly, ‘‘feeling’’ responses made up only 27.1% (N = 
73) of the 273 responses. The feeling responses affirmed the qualitative experience of dissonance 
as ‘‘conflict,’’ feeling ‘‘torn’’ and ‘‘ambivalent.’’ 
Table 1 is omitted from this formatted document. 
Additional study findings noted a surprisingly high level of support among participants for 
involuntary treatment interventions in general, especially emergency hospitalization and 
mandated outpatient counseling. Participants most often cited situations of imminent danger as 
the necessity for involuntary interventions and, consequently, had the most experience with 
emergency psychiatric hospitalizations as well as mandated outpatient counseling. 
DISCUSSION 
Study Limitations 
As a ‘‘first-generation,’’ exploratory study, the current research has several limitations that are 
especially evident in the areas of instrument design and sampling frame. The study vignettes, by 
far, appeared the most problematic of the instrument components. A full 20% of all participants 
wrote in unsolicited feedback, much relating to the fact that they would not in reality intervene in 
the manner of the hypothetical practitioner the vignette portrayed. While apparently troubled by 
the events depicted in the vignettes, participants had relatively low levels of endorsement of 
dissonance-reducing cognitions. Indicating that either they did not identify with the listed 
strategies, or did not feel dissonant in that what they read did not cause conflict. These results 
indicate a failure of the vignettes to do what they were designed to do in producing dissonant 
feelings in participants. Another explanation is that social-desirability bias prevented participants 
from endorsing cognitions that seemed insensitive, such as ‘‘Tom’s really not that opposed to 
medication,’’ or ‘‘Sherry doesn’t know what she’s saying.’’ Problems related to the instrument 
design are closely associated with possible study design issues. For example, the projective 
design of the instrument (utilizing a hypothetical practitioner in a case vignette) may have set up 
a situation in which the interventions could be intensely criticized without being ‘‘owned’’ by 
respondents. In other words, instead of choosing to intervene in a delicate situation and dealing 
with the resulting dissonance, study respondents could comment on the problems with the 
intervention from a safe ‘‘moral high ground.’’ A remedy for both the instrument design 
limitations as well as the study design issues could involve a structured interview design for 
future studies that would allow more detail and process dimensions involved in intervention 
decisions. Specifically, allowing a participant the space to take the researcher through their 
decision-making process with all of the ‘‘but-on-the-other-hands’’ that are involved in real 
practice interventions should provide richer information on professional dissonance in mental 
health practice.  
An additional limitation that was expected from the beginning of the study was with the sample. 
The researcher made an informed choice to err on the side of experience in the field for this first 
exploratory dissonance study. The strategy worked in that participants had an average of 25 
years of experience, however, in choosing this more seasoned population, ‘‘front-line’’ 
practitioners in case management positions were not extensively sampled. These newer workers 
may have a different understanding of dissonance than their more mature colleagues. Future 
studies should target this group of workers. 
Study Contributions and Implications 
Possibly one of the strongest contributions of this study is the actual subject matter. Research on 
practice issues relating to involuntary treatment with people who have serious mental illness, and 
research on operationalizing values for practice is underrepresented in the social work and allied 
literature. Studying professional dissonance affirms the importance of dealing with these critical 
issues in mental health practice by illuminating the complexities of practice where coercive 
elements exist and practitioner and consumer wants and needs are often at odds.  
The research described was motivated primarily by a desire to better practice with persons who 
have serious mental illness as well as to protect the longevity and emotional well-being of the 
practitioners who everyday engage in sorting out practice situations the best way they can. The 
study results are applicable to practice issues along several dimensions. First, through the open-
ended data regarding involuntary treatment, self-determination and professional dissonance, 
participants affirmed their reliance upon their colleagues both in and adjacent to the profession to 
sort out difficult situations. In these days of cut-backs in social service and burgeoning case-
loads, the affirmation of the place of peer support and quality supervision is a very important one 
in real world practice. 
Study respondents also pointed to their process of deciding what was most important as a guide 
to managing anxiety about practice decisions. Many respondents cited the necessity of curbing 
the pursuit of other treatment goals when the goal of safety becomes the most important. Other 
participants pointed to their practice of referring to values espoused by their agency, their Code 
of Ethics or their licensing board. The idea of rank-ordering ethical principles has been offered 
by Loewenberg et al. (2000) as a way to help resolve ethical and value dilemmas and may be 
instrumental in dissonance resolution for practitioners in tough clinical situations. 
The current research focused a great deal on the experience of conflict, ambivalence and anxiety 
among social workers when trying to decide what is the next right thing in practice interventions 
amid the ‘‘gray areas’’ of mental health. One of the major contributions of existential theory, 
however, is to recast anxiety from a negative hobgoblin of burn-out and attrition in practice into 
a state of potentiality. This spirit of ‘‘becoming’’ can enliven the concept of professional 
dissonance in a way that moves it from a pathological problem needing a cure to a practice 
process that signals avenues of change. 
Along this line, respondents affirmed their willingness to ‘‘sit with’’ dilemmas in order to work 
them through. One reported seeing dilemmas as ‘‘A golden opportunity to review what is really 
important.’’ Another agreed, ‘‘Life is full of conflicts. Things are not simple.’’ The practice 
wisdom of the sample population was evident in this area. Respondents also spoke to the 
importance of simply doing the best they could as practitioners: ‘‘Make a decision, move on, let 
go,’’ ‘‘Pray I’m doing the right thing.’’ It would seem that perhaps the idea of ‘‘good enough 
practice’’ especially when partnering with consumers has potential for mental health practice and 
may go a long way in helping to prevent burn-out from unresolved professional dissonance. This 
dimension of living with dissonance and doing the best you can has implications for education of 
future mental health practitioners to help them learn to expect dissonance and dilemmas and 
normalize the process while underlining the importance of life-long supervision and collegial 
support. 
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